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1. Introduction
Similar to other OECD countries, Mexico has an aging population. In
many European countries the process is already directly reﬂected in
the share of the oldest cohorts, while in Mexico aging is still in its early
stages, reﬂected by a major decline in the size of the youngest age
cohorts (Burniaux, Duval and Jaumotte, 2004; Wong, 2001; Z´ u˜ niga
Herrera, 2004). Despite the relatively young population, the decline
of the youngest cohorts implies that in the long run the share of older
people will increase drastically.
Insight into the factors that determine the labor force partic-
ipation decisions of elderly workers therefore becomes increasingly
important. Financial incentives allowing (early) retirement are of-
ten found to be an important determinant of the decision at hand,
but in Mexico the pensions are less generous than in most European
countries. Because of a lack of ﬁnancial resources, elderly are more
likely to continue working. Other factors such as the health may how-
ever pose restrictions on the employability of the elderly. The role of
health in labor force participation and retirement decisions, and more
generally the link between health and socio-economic status, is not
well understood (Smith, 1999; Adams et al., 2003) but is important
to predict the impact of policies that aim to stimulate labor force
participation and improve the health of the population. One reason
why the relation between labor and health is not clearly understood
is the diﬃculty involved in measuring the health status. Another is
that health may be an endogenous variable in the explanation of labor
force participation: there may be a causality running in the opposite
direction, from work to health.
In this paper the determinants of the labor force participation
of men and women aged 50 and more years in Mexico are analyzed.
In particular we study the importance of health for the participation
decision, acknowledging the measurement issue and the potential en-
dogeneity of health. Research on this question has frequently been
performed for the USA and European countries, but in a developing
economy like Mexico the relation between work and health may be
diﬀerent because variations in institutions governing the labor market
generate diﬀerences in opportunities. We analyze the role of health
in the labor force participation decision using the ﬁrst wave of the
Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS), a survey held in 2001 rep-
resentative for the Mexican population aged 50 and over. The outline
of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the framework for labor
supply decisions of elderly workers, taking into account retirement
options and other factors. In section 3 the data are introduced. TheTHE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH 91
modeling strategy is outlined in section 4, while the analysis of the de-
terminants of labor force participation decisions including tests of the
endogeneity and mismeasurement of health are presented in section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
Given the focus on the attachment of persons over 50 years old to the
labor market, retirement decision models form the theoretical back-
ground for the empirical analysis. The framework of the analysis is
deﬁned by the life cycle model describing the trade-oﬀ between con-
sumption and leisure over the remaining lifetime of a worker (Lums-
daine and Mitchell, 1999; Stock and Wise, 1990). A worker chooses
his or her retirement age, the age at which he or she withdraws from
the labor force, such that the expected utility over the remaining
lifetime is maximized. The budget constraint of the maximization
problem consists of the present values of labor and non-labor income
(including pensions) as well as leisure. When the utility gained from
taking leisure exceeds the utility of working one more year, the worker
will decide to retire and refrain from further participation in the labor.
In many countries social security provisions and private pension
plans are found to be important determinants of the retirement be-
havior of the elderly. Often the regulations give strong incentives to
continue working at least until a certain age while giving disincentives
to continue working at older ages. From empirical research it appears
that older people have a strong preference for leisure, and it is found
that workers with generous pensions tend to retire earlier (Gruber
and Wise, 1999, 2004; Blundell, Meghir, and Smith, 2002). Explicit
ﬁnancial incentives to delay retirement tend to have the expected
eﬀect of postponing retirement (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999; Gru-
ber and Wise, 1999, 2004). The analyses in Gruber and Wise (2004)
show that incentives set by the social security system have similarly
strong eﬀects in all the countries that they review, despite the very
diﬀerent cultural histories underlying the systems. For example in
the USA there are peaks in retirement at ages 62 and 65 that are the
consequence of the beneﬁt schemes (Rust and Phelan, 1997). Most
employees have not saved enough to retire without receiving pub-
lic social security or contributions from employer-provided pension
beneﬁts. Retirement before the date at which public or private con-
tributions start is therefore rare (Gruber and Wise, 2004).
For the majority of the elderly Mexicans the ﬁnancial situation
is not so generous that they can aﬀord to stop working early. The92 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
largest pension funds are the IMSS for the private sector and ISSSTE
for the employees in the public sector, but few of the elderly eﬀectively
receive pension beneﬁts. In 1996 only 30.5% of the men over 60 years
received a pension, while among women pensions due to their own
labor career were even scarcer, only 14.8% (Parker and Wong, 2001).
Like health insurance and social security, pensions are job-related and
only available for workers in formal jobs. Access to pensions is further
restricted because a minimum duration of contributions is required
and transfers between funds are limited. The replacement rate, i.e.
the pension as a percentage of the pre-retirement earnings, varies with
the number of contributed years and the earlier wage earnings but is
typically below 50% (Duval, 2003). More than in European countries
or the US, a lack of resources forces continuation of the labor force
participation beyond the oﬃcial retirement age of 65.
In retirement models health status is recognized as a potential
determinant of the optimal retirement age (Lumsdaine and Mitchell,
1999). Poorer health can reduce the productivity of a worker and
therefore reduce earnings, thus bringing down the optimal retirement
age. Job tasks may be more demanding when one has a weaker health,
therefore changing the preferences in favor of leisure. More time may
be necessary to care for one’s health, further increasing the utility
of leisure and thus reducing participation. Poor health may lead to
entitlement for disability beneﬁts, which would reduce labor force
participation. All these factors contribute to an earlier retirement. A
counter-eﬀect is that the utility of consumption may increase relative
to leisure given that the costs of treatment may increase necessary
expenses. This would postpone retirement. Another eﬀect of poor
health is a reduced life expectancy, which shortens the time horizon
of the optimization problem. An anticipated negative health shock
results in a shorter work life and in fewer retirement years. The
overall theoretical eﬀect of health on retirement age is ambiguous, but
most arguments point towards a relation where poor health lowers the
retirement age and reduces labor force participation.
2.1. Measurement of Health
Empirical analysis of the eﬀect of health on labor force participa-
tion is hampered by complications regarding the measurement of
health status. Often a self-evaluated health status is available in sur-
veys, through a question that asks respondents whether they consider
their own health status as good or bad. Several problems with self-THE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH 93
evaluated health exist (Bound, 1991; Bound it et al., 1999). The vari-
able is suspected to be endogenous with respect to the participation
decision. Because bad health is a legitimate reason for working-age
people to abstain from participation, people may justify their with-
drawal from the labor market by overreporting their health problems
(see e.g. Anderson and Burkhauser, 1985). This is referred to as
the ‘justiﬁcation hypothesis’, and it causes self-evaluated health to
be linked to a person’s attitude towards work or the preference for
leisure and does not necessarily capture the actual productive capac-
ity. Another reason for endogeneity of health is that it can be aﬀected
by one’s work, for example, if labor circumstances are dangerous or
working hours so long that having a job results in the deterioration of
a worker’s health. A positive direct eﬀect is also possible, being active
in the labor market may contribute to one’s satisfaction and thereby
also to (actual or perceived) well-being. For that reason the self-rated
health may not be independent of the labor market decisions, and the
explanatory power of health found in a participation equation may
be spurious. Another concern is that it can be questioned whether
one self-evaluated measure can capture all the dimensions of health.
Diseases and other health problems can result in a variety of physical
and cognitive limitations with diﬀerent implications for labor capac-
ities. Even if endogeneity due to reverse causality is not a problem,
the self-assessed health may be incapable of capturing all dimensions,
implying a measurement error problem.
Data that contain both (subjective) self-evaluated health and de-
tailed (objective) information on physical and mental health status
can be used to test if endogeneity due to a direct dependence on par-
ticipation or due to the justiﬁcation hypothesis is indeed a problem,
and if the set of objective health variables gives a better description
of the actual productive capacity of a worker.
2.2. Empirical Evidence
International empirical evidence suggests that poor health negatively
aﬀects labor force participation and leads to an earlier retirement,
but the range of estimates varies widely, partly due to the variety
of measures applied (Currie and Madrian, 1999). Findings indicate
that health may be a more important determinant of wages and labor
force participation in less developed countries than in more developed
countries (Currie and Madrian, 1999).
Some studies directly apply a self-evaluated health measure (e.g.
Rust and Phelan, 1997; Blundell, Meghir, and Smith, 2002) with-94 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
out carefully analyzing the potential endogeneity. The endogeneity
problem can be tackled by instrumenting self-evaluated health using
available objective health indicators such as the prevalence of dis-
eases, medicine usage, or functional limitations. In that case a single
exogenous health indicator is included in the equation of interest, the
retirement or participation decision. Findings are mixed, some re-
searchers ﬁnd indications of endogeneity (e.g. Kerkhofs, Lindeboom,
and Theeuwes, 1999; Disney, Emmerson and Wakeﬁeld, 2006; Cai
and Kalb, 2006), but in other cases there is no or only weak evidence
that self-rated health is endogenous (e.g. Stern, 1989; Dwyer and
Mitchell, 1999; Wolﬀ, 2005). Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) also test
for the endogeneity of objective measures, using parent’s health and
mortality and respondent’s height/weight ratio as instruments, and
conclude that there is no problem of endogeneity of health. Following
a diﬀerent approach, exploiting the availability in the data set of both
self-rated disability and the receipt of disability beneﬁts (indicating
oﬃcially, objectively approved disability), B´ enitez-Silva et al. (2004)
conclude that the subjective and objective measures are suﬃciently
close to each other and that therefore the hypothesis that subjective
disability is an unbiased estimator of the objectively determined dis-
ability cannot be rejected. In an analysis of ten European countries
Kalwij and Vermeulen (2007) ﬁnd that the (one-dimensional) self-
evaluated health status should be considered as endogenous in some
but not all countries. They conclude that health should be included
as a multidimensional factor, but also that the dimensions important
in explaining the participation decision diﬀer between the countries.
To summarize, in general a negative eﬀect of health on partic-
ipation is found, while evidence that participation aﬀects health is
mixed. Cutler et al. (2000) showed that the economic crises that
hit Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s increased the mortality rates by
reducing incomes, suggesting that in Mexico a relation running from
labor market status to health exists.
3. Data: The Case of Mexico
The data used in this paper are from the Mexican Health and Aging
Study (MHAS, in Spanish Encuesta nacional sobre salud y envejeci-
miento en M´ exico (ENASEM); Puig, Pagan y Soldo, 2006). MHAS is
organized as a panel survey, where the baseline survey (held in 2001)
is constructed as a nationally representative sample of the about 13
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tions about socio-demographic status (including information on chil-
dren living outside the household), health status, functional limita-
tions, use of health services and other sources of help, current and
past labor status, sources of income and properties. Only the base-
line survey is used in this paper. Thus we work with a cross-section
of elderly.1
Both the heads of the selected households as well as their partners
were interviewed, resulting in a total sample size of 15,186 individ-
uals. Excluded from the analysis are (2,907) people who answered
negatively to an initial question if they ever worked for income or
proﬁts. For them, the attachment to the labor market can be con-
sidered so weak that it is likely that current decisions are based on
diﬀerent grounds than choices made by people who have experience
in the labor market. Furthermore, 1,264 observations on partners
younger than 50 are not considered in the analysis. Dropping some
cases with incomplete information on essential variables leaves us with
a ﬁnal set of 10,183 observations that is used for the analysis.
3.1. Labor Force Participation
In the analysis we focus on the extensive margin, thus on the deci-
sion whether someone participates in the labor market or not. The
employment status is derived from the question regarding the activ-
ities in the week before the interview. If the respondent indicated
that he or she worked during that week (52.2%), or did not work but
had a job (1.9%), the respondent is classiﬁed as a participant in the
labor market. Also those who reported to be looking for a job (0.5%)
are considered as participants; searching for a job means that they
actively participate in the labor market and have not yet decided to
retire.2 Those who dedicated themselves to household chores (24.6%)
are classiﬁed as non-participants, as are the people who answered not
to be working (20.8%).
Table 1 shows the labor force participation by age. Around 70%
of those in their early ﬁfties are working, a percentage that drops to
1 The set up and the available information are highly similar to surveys such
as the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US, the English Longitudinal
Survey on Ageing (ELSA) in the UK and the Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in 11 continental European countries.
2 Counting the latter as non-participants has only a minor impact on the
results due to the small size of the group.96 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
53% for people in their early sixties. The latter percentage is much
larger than in European countries, where about 38% of the men and
23% of the women aged 60-64 are working (Kalwij and Vermeulen,
2007; OECD, 2006). The oﬃcial retirement age in most European
countries is 65, but early retirement schemes often enable to stop
working at a younger age. After the age of 65, very few people choose
to continue working. The highest percentage of working people aged
over 65 reported for western European countries is 10.1% in Sweden
(OECD, 2006). For Mexico the same source reports a participation
rate of 29.2% for people aged 65 and over. Therefore it is reasonable
to include also the older elderly in our analysis instead of restricting
it to people aged between 50 and 65. In our sample we observe that
18% of the respondents aged 80 or over report to be working.3
3.2. Health Status
The MHAS asks for a self-evaluated, subjective, health assessment and
contains objective information based on observations by medical per-
sonnel as well. Self-assessed health is measured by the question about
the respondent’s general health: “Would you say your health is...”,
with ﬁve possible answers: excellent, very good, good, fair or poor.
Nothing is mentioned about the reference group that a respondent
should keep in mind. This could be an important source of mea-
surement error as some respondents may compare their health with
earlier stages in life or with younger persons, while others may refer
to people who have a similar age as themselves.
3 For readability we write ‘working’, however the numbers indicate that they
are economically active or are looking for work. Diﬀerences in deﬁnitions of par-
ticipation cause diﬀerences in the participation rate between the OECD-source
and our numbers. With our deﬁnition we stay as close as possible to the active
population. In particular our deﬁnition captures the people working in the infor-
mal sector. As an alternative we could have used the survey question that asks if
the respondent had a principal job during the year before the survey. The ques-
tion clearly refers to having a (paid) job elsewhere, as it is posed after questions
regarding one’s own business or farm. If we use that variable, the participation
rate would drop from 54.6% to 30.6%. Participation of people aged 65-80 (17%)
and over 80 (7%) remains sizable, but probably this measure does not capture
all the people who work for money. Also we do not use the question on retire-
ment beneﬁts; receiving beneﬁts does not imply retirement as it is possible for
the recipient to remain active in another (formal or informal) occupation.THE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH 97
The objective health information is collected via a large set of
questions regardingspeciﬁc health problems (see table 2). These ques-
tions are also answered by the respondent, but the level of speciﬁcity
and concreteness of the questions and concepts leaves much less room
for a subjective answer than is the case with the question regard-
ing the general health status. Detailed information about the preva-
lence of hypertension, diabetes, cancer, respiratory problems, heart
problems, stroke, and arthritis is asked. We use the information on
whether the disease or symptoms ever occurred; that is, whether a
doctor or other medical personnel has ever told the respondent that
he or she suﬀered from the disease at hand. For liver or kidney in-
fections, tuberculosis and pneumonia it is asked whether in the two
years before the survey a doctor or other medical personnel has told
the respondent that he or she had the problem. Further we use the
question whether the respondent has fallen down in the last two years
(with or without breaking bones).
Table 1
Labor force participation by age and gender
Participation (%) Sample size
Total Men Women (%)
Full sample
50 or more 54.6 70.2 35.4 100
Per age group
50 - 54 70.7 90.1 49.0 26.9
55 - 59 64.7 83.6 42.3 21.6
60 - 64 53.0 70.8 32.3 17.0
65 - 69 45.3 59.9 25.0 13.3
70 - 74 39.1 51.4 20.4 9.3
75 - 79 30.0 38.0 17.5 6.6
80 or more 18.5 24.6 10.9 5.3
Sample size (%) 100 55.3 44.7 (10,183 obs.)
A Mokken scale analysis (Mokken, 1971) indicates that the nine
questions about the mental health (“did you feel depressed?”, “did
you feel happy?”, “did you feel lonely?”, etc.) all measure the same98 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
underlying concept and can be combined into one measure of mental
health status. Questions about the performance of functional activi-
ties and activities of daily living consider problems such as limitations
with walking, sitting, climbing stairs, stretching the arms, lifting ob-
jects, bathing, getting in and out of the bed, using the toilet, shop-
ping, or preparing food. A Mokken scale analysis indicates that the
22 items describe the same underlying factor, which implies that a
count of the number of activities (items) on which the respondent re-
ports a problem can be considered a good indicator of the intensity of
problems associated with the performance of (instrumental) activities
of daily living ((i)adl in the table below).
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of health problems
Mean St. dev.
self-assessed health (0=poor, 4=excellent) 1.31 0.86
hypertens./high blood pressure 0.360 0.480
diabetes/high blood sugar lev. 0.154 0.361
cancer/malignant tumor 0.017 0.131
respiratory illn. (eg asthma) 0.063 0.242
heart attack 0.034 0.182
stroke 0.025 0.157
arthritis/rheumatism 0.197 0.398
liver/kidney infection (in last 2 yrs) 0.101 0.302
tuberculosis (in last 2 yrs) 0.003 0.057
pneumonia (in last 2 yrs) 0.014 0.119
fallen down (in last 2 yrs) 0.357 0.479
# mental health probl. (max.9) 3.46 2.66
# problems with (i)adl (max.22) 3.58 4.13
Note: All indicators (except the ﬁrst one and the ﬁnal two) are dummy vari-
ables (where 1 indicates the existence of the problem). Mental health is measured
on a scale from 0 to 9, and (i)adl ranges from 0 to 22, where a higher score indi-
cates more severe problems. The scale for self-assessed health ranges from poor
(0) to excellent (4) –opposite to the order in the survey– such that a higher value
is associated with a better health.THE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH 99
3.3. Other Variables
In section 5, the labor force participation is analyzed by linking it with
the health situation of the respondents, and with the age, household
composition, level of education, and the ﬁnancial situation (table 3).
Slightly less than half of the sample is female, even though Mexico is
no exception to the common observation that women live longer and
thus constitute more than half of the elderly population. The under-
representation of women in our sample is caused by the selection
of elderly who reported that they have ever worked for income or
proﬁts: more women than men have never life worked for income or
proﬁts. About 70% of the sampled elderly report to be married or
living together in a consensual union, and on average the number of
children born to the elderly equals 5.8. More than 60% of the sample
live in cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants.
The potential wage rate, often used as a predictor in labor force
participation models, is excluded from our empirical analysis. Cur-
rent wage rates are only observable for people who are working. Po-
tential wages can be predicted for those who are not working, using
variables such as the age and the level of education. We prefer direct
inclusion of these variables in our model explaining the participation
decision. About three out of four of the elderly in the sample have
none or only primary education. In order to have more variation in
the education, and to capture additional courses or on-the-job train-
ing, we include variables that indicate if the respondents are able to
read and write and can count. Further we have information if the
respondents are able to speak English or an indigenous language (not
necessarily as their primary language). The survey contains informa-
tion on the assets owned by the household. We include the total net
value of real estate, investments, savings, stocks, shares and bonds,
and private means of transport as an indicator of the wealth of the
elderly.4 The expectation is that the possession of more assets may
enable elderly to withdraw from the labor market.
We also have information on the main job that was held by the
respondent throughout his or her life, thus on the work history of
the respondent. In particular we know the type of occupation (based
on INEGI’s Mexican Classiﬁcation of Occupations) and the type of
4 The net value of business ownership is not included in the wealth measure.
Although the elderly can sell the business and stop working, it is also a direct
motivator to continue working. Inclusion of business ownership would make the
role of assets diﬃcult to interpret.100 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
contract. The most common occupations are manufacturing ((in-
dustrial) production, repair, maintenance: 29%), work in the agri-
cultural sector (20%) and services (workers in the service industry
and domestic service workers: 19%). Working for a salary was the
most common situation throughout their life for almost 60% of the
respondents, while more than a quarter used to be self-employed.
Self-employment and/or an occupation in the agricultural sector or
as a domestic worker are more likely to be arranged informally. In-
formal sector jobs do not give access to retirement pensions, and are
thus expected to raise the probability of remaining active in the labor
market at old age. Another indicator of the sector of employment is if
someone ever deposited money into a retirement pension. For elderly
under 65 years old, having participated in a retirement fund is likely
to increase the probability of being employed at the moment of the
survey because a minimum duration or even participation at the age
of 65 (the oﬃcial retirement age) may be a requirement for future
claims from the fund. For elderly aged 65 or more, previous contri-
butions may have created the possibility of becoming a claimant and
thus are likely to reduce labor force participation. Note that among
the younger elderly a larger fraction (36.5%) has contributed to a
retirement pension than among the older generation (30.1%). On av-
erage the elderly contributed slightly more than 7 years, which is far
lower than their (likely) number of years of labor market activities,
indicating that informal jobs must have been a common experience.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of individual characteristics
Mean St. dev.















preparatory or higher 0.113 0.317
Other human capital indicatorsa
able to read and write 0.822 0.382
able to count from 1 to 10 0.937 0.242
able to speak English 0.099 0.299
able to speak indigenous language 0.077 0.266
Urbanizationa
locality size: >100000 0.609 0.488
locality size: 15000-100000 0.149 0.356
locality size: 2500-15000 0.085 0.279
locality size: <2500 0.158 0.364
Assets
non-business assets (*$1mln) 0.329 0.636
Deposited into retirement funda
among elderly under 65
a 0.365 0.482
among elderly over 65
a 0.301 0.459
number of years with deposits 7.3 12.6
Type of occupationa
production, repair, maint. 0.290 0.454
agriculture 0.197 0.398
proﬀ., technic., educat. 0.095 0.293
management position 0.018 0.133
administrative activ. 0.072 0.258
merchants, sales repr. 0.129 0.335
service ind., domest. w. 0.194 0.395





employee, ﬁxed salary 0.579 0.494
boss 0.036 0.187
self-employed 0.272 0.445
commission, other paym 0.071 0.256
without payment 0.035 0.185
other/unknown 0.007 0.081
Note: a = dummy variable(s).
4. Methodology
Our intention is to analyze the role of health in labor force partici-
pation decisions by Mexican elderly. Subjective and objective eval-
uations of the health status are available to us, but both have its
drawbacks. In the self-evaluated (subjective) health measure the re-
spondent can weight all aspects of health, and therefore it is expected
to capture all attributes considered relevant by the respondent, but
it potentially suﬀers from endogeneity and measurement error, as
addressed in Section 2. At the same time it is not clear that the
more detailed, objective, indicators summarized in Section 3 provide
a better measurement of the productive capacities. Using this set
of indicators assumes that the (in)activity is related to the speciﬁc
health descriptions, but - despite the level of detail - the set of char-
acteristics is inherently incomplete and possibly does not capture the
full range of relevant health dimensions.
A natural strategy in the search for a causal eﬀect is to build a
structural model and use both subjective and objective health infor-
mation. In particular it is possible to construct a variable that rep-
resents each individual’s ’health stock’, stripped of subjectivity and
endogeneity, and use that as a proxy for health in a model for the
participation decision (Stern, 1989; Bound et al., 1999; Campolieti,
2002; Cai and Kalb, 2006; Disney, Emmerson and Wakeﬁeld, 2006).THE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH 103
To construct the health stock, an auxiliary regression of the self-
assessed measure on the set of objective health measures and on the
other personal characteristics is performed. A similar strategy can
be followed to account for the potential endogeneity of labor force
participation when explaining the level of health. The constructed
health stock and propensity of participation can be used as explana-
tory variables in the structural equations. The model is outlined more
precisely here, before we discuss the results in section 5.
4.1. Set-up of the Model
The central issue of the paper is the eﬀect of health on the labor force
participation. Participation can be described as a function of the true
health status H∗∗
i , a set of individual characteristics xi such as age,
gender, etc., and a set of work history characteristics (ziP) uniquely





i + βPxi + γPziP + uiP,
where P ∗
i is an unobserved (latent) variable that represents the pro-
pensity that an elderly person participates in the labor force. The
parameter λP measures the causal eﬀect of health on the participation
decision. Observed is the dichotomous labor force participation Pi,
where Pi equals 1 if P ∗
i > 0, and zero otherwise.






i + βHxiH + γHziH + viH,
where H∗∗
i represents the true but unobservable health status. True
health depends on the same set of individual characteristics xi as
included in the labor force participation equation, on a detailed set of
personal health characteristics ziH that is included only in the health
equation, and on the (latent) propensity to work P ∗
i . The parameter
αH thus represents the (causal) eﬀect of labor force participation
on the true health. The eﬀect could be negative (e.g. because of
bad labor conditions) or positive (e.g. due to increased satisfaction
and (perceived) well-being). As said, true health H∗∗
i is unobserved.
What we observe is the subjective, self-assessed health Hi, measured
on a ﬁve-point scale (see section 3). Let H∗
i be the continuous latent
counterpart of the observed self-assessed health, and assume Hi =
k(k =0 ,...,4) when mk <H ∗
i ≤ mk+1 (mk are unknown cut-oﬀ
points to be estimated along with the other parameters while m0 =
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In addition to the eﬀect of labor on true health, measured by ?H,
there is the justiﬁcation hypothesis that states that non-participants
justify their non-participation by exaggeratingthe self-assessed health
problems (see section 2). If justiﬁcation is a problem, there will be a
diﬀerence between the true and the self-assessed health,
H∗
i = H∗∗
i + δHP ∗
i + εiH,
with a positive value of the parameter σH: when participating elderly
(who have a larger value of P ∗
i ) report a better health status (H∗
i )
than they have in reality (H∗∗
i ).




i − εiH, in the participation equation yields the labor force par-









P = λP/(1 + δHλP),β1
P = βP/(1 + δHλP),γ1
P = γP/(1 +
δHλP) and u1
iP =( uiP −λPεiH)/(1+δHλP). Substitution of the rela-
tion between true and self-assessed health in the true health equation








i + βHxi + γHziH + uiH (2)
where α1
H = αH + δH and uiH = viH + εiH.
Equations (1) and (2) link labor force participation and self-
assessed health to each other. Only the sum of the two sources of
endogeneity, α1
H, is identiﬁable, but whether the endogeneity occurs
because participation directly aﬀects the true health status (αH)o r
is due to justiﬁcation of the labor status (δH) is not identiﬁable.
However the sign of α1
H can give useful information about which type
of endogeneity dominates.
4.2. Estimation of the Model
Equations (1) and (2) constitute a simultaneous equations model.
The inclusion of diﬀerent variables in ziH and ziP guarantees the
identiﬁcation of the model, but it cannot be estimated by standard
techniques because we observe qualitative dependent variables instead
of continuous variables. Given that the observed self-assessed health
Hi is measured on a ﬁve-point scale, and assuming that uiH and u1
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are normally distributed, equation (2) is essentially an ordered probit
model, while equation (1) is a probit model.
Stern (1989) proposes a two-stage approach, essentially an in-
strumental variable method, to estimate the parameters of the model
formed by equations (1) and (2). In the ﬁrst stage, a reduced form
participation equation including all the variables in xi, ziH and ziP
is estimated via a probit procedure. The results from that estimation
can be used to calculate the propensity to participate in the labor
market, P ∧
i . In the same manner, a reduced form health equation
can be estimated by ordered probit, whose results can be used to
calculate the predicted ‘health stock’ ˆ Hi of each individual.
In the second stage the structural model deﬁned by equations (1)
and (2) is estimated, where the predictions ˆ Hi and P ∧
i replace the
potentially endogenous explanatory variables H∗











i + βHxi + γHziH + uiH (4)
For equation (3) a standard probit with Pi as dependent variable
suﬃces while equation (4) with Hi as the dependent variable can be
estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors can be bootstrapped to
account for the inclusion of the predicted variables P ∧
i and ˆ Hi. The
two-stage approach gives consistent estimates but ignores the cor-
relation between the error terms uiH and u1
iP. Nonzero correlation
could be allowed in a maximum likelihood procedure, which would
give estimates that are both consistent and eﬃcient, but a simulta-
neous equations model of an ordered probit and probit type is not
straightforward to estimate. Only Cai and Kalb (2006) follow a full-
information maximum likelihood approach and ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant
correlation for men and a signiﬁcantly negative value for women. The
negative value implies that not controlling for this correlation would
give a bias towards zero in the eﬀect of health on participation (Stern,
1989; Cai and Kalb, 2006). We have more detailed information than
Cai and Kalb (2006), both on work history and on diseases and symp-
toms, which is likely to diminish the probability that omitted unob-
served factors aﬀect both labor force participation and health, and
thus increases the likelihood that our assumption that the correlation
(ρ) equals zero is valid.5
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We are interested in knowing the causal eﬀect of health on par-
ticipation. Self-evaluated health is endogenous in the participation
decision if the fact whether one participates or not has an eﬀect on
the reported health. The null hypothesis for exogeneity therefore is
H0 :( α1
H =0 ,ρ = 0), which under the assumption that ρ is equal
to zero breaks down to a test of the signiﬁcance of α1
H in equation
(4). Due to the assumed absence of correlation, it remains a partial
test for exogeneity. An alternative test for the exogeneity of health in
the participation decision is the Hausman test (Smith and Blundell,
1986). A regression-based Hausman test adds the prediction error
of the health equation (4), ˆ uiH = H∗
i − ˆ Hi, as an explanatory vari-
able to the participation equation (1) and tests its signiﬁcance. If the
prediction error has a signiﬁcant contribution in the explanation of
labor force participation, there is evidence that the model suﬀers from
misspeciﬁcation, which can be due to endogeneity of health. A com-
plication is that the test requires an observable measure, while the
latent variable H∗
i in equation (1) is not observed. We will replace
it by the observable variable Hi. Kalwij and Vermeulen (2007) use
an intuitively appealing approach by including both the self-assessed
health Hi in the equation as well as the set of diseases and symptoms
underlying the predictions ˆ Hi, thereby providing an alternative to the
Hausman test. In this paper the three approaches for the exogeneity
and misspeciﬁcation tests are applied.
4.3. Expectations
The consequence of endogeneity due to justiﬁcation is that when self-
assessed health is treated as exogenous in the participation equation,
the eﬀect of health on participation tends to be overestimated: the
relation between participation and health appears stronger because
the exaggeration of health problems by the non-participating elderly
generates a causation running in the opposite direction. Instrumen-
tation with objective measures corrects for this justiﬁcation bias and
will reduce the estimated eﬀect of health in comparison with a model
that applies self-assessed health as an explanatory variable.
Direct causality from labor force participation to (true) health
can have positive and negative eﬀects, as mentioned before. If work
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makes people happier we will overestimate the relation when estimat-
ing participation as a function of health because part of the causation
runs in the other direction, similar to the eﬀect of the justiﬁcation
hypothesis. Instrumentation gives a corrected eﬀect that is lower
than the eﬀect found when using self-assessed health. A negative di-
rect causation exists if labor circumstances make people sick. Using
health as an explanatory variable of the participation decision then
underestimates the true eﬀect because it will include the causal ef-
fect that runs in the opposite direction. In that case instrumentation
will give a larger parameter estimate than a model with self-assessed
health.
A third reason for biases is incorrect measurement. In linear
models, measurement errors in explanatory variables typically result
in estimated eﬀects biased towards zero (Wooldridge, 2002:75). In
limited-dependent variable models this does not always hold, but of-
ten it remains true (Hausman, 2001). Thus if measurement error in
the health variable is a problem, that is if self-assessed health does
not fully describe the relevant health situation, instrumentation will
generally strengthen the eﬀect of health.
5. Results
In this section the results of the estimation of the two-stage model
outlined in the previous section are discussed. We brieﬂy comment
on the results of the ﬁrst-stage reduced forms as it gives an idea of
the validity of the constructed variables, before we move on to the
structural model and ﬁnish with the alternative tests.
5.1. First-Stage Regressions
The ﬁrst-stage results (Appendix) show a strong link between the
self-assessed health status and the more detailed health indicators
(ziH). This is what we hoped for, as these are the exogenous iden-
tifying variables that get excluded from the second-stage labor force
participation equation. Especially having diabetes or a respiratory
disease (asthma), or having survived a heart attack strongly reduce
the perceived health. Other diseases like rheumatism, high blood
pressure, liver and kidney problems, pneumonia, or ever having suf-
fered from cancer or a stroke have smaller but important eﬀects on
the reported health. Having fallen down or having suﬀered tuber-
culosis has a less pronounced relation to perceived health. Mental108 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
health problems and functional limitations with the performance of
the activities of daily living (adl) also have strong negative eﬀects on
the self-assessed health.
Several of the characteristics describing the career history (ziP),
which will be excluded from the second-stage health equation, are
signiﬁcant in the reduced-form labor force participation equation. In
particular people who used to be self-employed or who worked as a
boss in their main job during their work-life are more likely to be at
work at the moment of the survey than salaried employees.6
The ﬁrst-stage reduced-form models are used to calculate the
predictions ˆ Hi and P ∧
i that are used in the second-stage (structural)
regressions given by equations (3) and (4).
5.2. Second Stage Regressions
The ﬁrst column of table 4 shows that the predicted health stock
has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the labor force participation.
Better health is associated with a stronger attachment to the labor
market. The parameter estimate of 0.310 implies that for the average
elderly person in the sample, an increase in health from its mean
value by one standard deviation (say, roughly a shift from ‘fair’ to
‘good’ health) raises the probability of being employed from 0.559
6 In both equations a test of the signiﬁcance of the identifying variables
strongly rejects the hypothesis that they are jointly zero, thus they correlate
highly with the potential endogenous variable, which fulﬁlls one requirement to
be considered valid instruments. The other requirement is that the excluded vari-
ables should not correlate with the error term of the equation. Some of the objec-
tive health characteristics, in particular an earlier stroke, hypertension, diabetes,
or having functional limitations, are signiﬁcant in the labor force participation
equation (similar as in e.g. Stern, 1989). Overidentiﬁcation tests (Lee, 1992) in-
dicate that they do not satisfy the exclusion restrictions but have an independent
eﬀect on participation. Dropping the involved diseases and symptoms gives a set
of variables that passes the test, but obviously invalidates the interpretation of
the constructed health stock as a measure that summarizes all health conditions.
Second-stage estimations, which separately include the health variables that have
an independent eﬀect on participation have been performed, and give largely the
same results while complicating the interpretation compared to estimations with
one health measure. Therefore we follow the literature and present the results of
second-stage estimations using all objective characteristics to create one general
measure for the health stock ( ˆ Hi) (see also table 5 and the section on alternative
tests). For the construction of the labor force participation index there are no
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to 0.657. The estimated parameter of the propensity of labor force
participation in the health equation (table 4, column 2) is small and
insigniﬁcant (-0.011), which conﬁrms the hypothesis that health can
be considered as an exogenous variable (H0 : α1
h = 0). The result thus
indicates that labor force participation does not aﬀect the reported
health status. The conclusion that health causes participation but
that participation does not cause health, thus that a better health
situation enables elderly to remain active in the labor market, is in
line with ﬁndings of many others (see section 2).
Financial variables have the expected impact on participation.
We ﬁnd that elderly aged over 65 who ever made contributions to a
retirement fund are less likely to be observed in employment, although
the eﬀect is only weakly signiﬁcant. The negative eﬀect, however, is
reinforced by the ﬁnding that the more years one contributed the less
likely is current participation. A simulation in which we implement
contributions to pension funds for every elderly during maximum 40
years (from age 25 to 65), reduces the probability of participation for
an average person aged over 65 from 0.325 to 0.235. This is a large
change, and probably even an overestimate of the participation as the
maintained assumption is that the reactions to all other factors do
not change. Imposing life-long contributions essentially implies that
everyone is able to claim beneﬁts, which, although nothing is said
about the size of the pension, is a major shift that may have impacts
on the reactions to other factors. For the elderly under 65 we ﬁnd
that those who have ever participated in a retirement fund are more
likely to be employed at the moment of the survey, which is in line
with the requirements of the funds. A simulation that supposes that
the elderly made contributions since they were aged 25 shows a small
increase of the participation rate from 0.679 to 0.704. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that elderly with more non-business assets (e.g. savings or
a house) are less likely to be working, suggesting that for wealthier
people it is easier to decide to retire. A general increase of non-
business assets by one standard deviation however gives only a small
reduction of the participation rate from 0.559 to 0.539.
A noteworthy eﬀect is the gender eﬀect on participation: even
after the initial elimination of (in majority female) persons who never
had a job, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly lower participation among elderly
women. The parameter estimate of -1.046 means that a man with
sample-average characteristics has a participation probability of 0.731
while for a woman with equal characteristics the probability is only
0.333.7 Participation among couples is lower than for single-living
7 The models have also been estimated with interaction terms. The interac-110 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
elderly, while living in a rural area increases the participation proba-
bility. Age has a steadily negative eﬀect on the participation proba-
bility.
The second column of table 4 shows that higher educated people
on average report better health, all other factors being equal, possibly
because of a higher awareness of health risks and increased access to
health care services. Somewhat surprisingly, speakers of indigenous
languages –often associated with lower education and poverty– report
better health. Living in a rural area on the other hand reduces the
reported health, given the other characteristics including the detailed
description of health.
The results suggest that there is no endogeneity problem with
health. It remains possible that people justify inactivity in the labor
market by exaggerating their health problems, and that bad labor
conditions reduce health, while the net eﬀect is equal to zero. Another
question that remains is whether the subjective and objective health
measures capture all the relevant aspects of health.
5.3. Alternative Tests
In the ﬁrst column of table 5 the self-assessed (subjective) health is
used as if it were an exogenous variable. Comparison of these re-
sults with the estimates in table 4 (column 1) shows that the use of
the predicted health stock leads to a stronger eﬀect of health on labor
force participation than the uncorrected estimates. Apparently, treat-
ing health as exogenous underestimates the eﬀect of health, which is
more in line with a direct negative eﬀect of participation on health
than with the justiﬁcation hypothesis. The (partial) test in table 4
however indicates that there is no endogeneity problem due to reverse
causality with self-assessed health, which suggests that justiﬁcation
and direct causality eliminate each other, and therefore another rea-
son for the underestimation becomes more likely: the eﬀect can also
be explained by a measurement error problem in the health variable.
The second column of table 5 shows the results of a Hausman test
including the diﬀerence between observed self-assessed health and pre-
dicted health stock to the labor force participation equation (eq. 1),
tion terms of age and gender are insigniﬁcant both in the participation and in
the health equation. Interaction between health and gender shows that the eﬀect
of health on participation is smaller for women than for men. Qualitatively the
results do not change while it complicates the presentation (Ai and Norton, 2003).
Therefore the results without interaction terms are presented and discussed. Fur-
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while replacing the latent (continuous) H∗
i by the observed (ﬁve-point
scaled) Hi. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant parameter estimate for the diﬀer-
ential term, which provides an indication that self-assessed health is
endogenous. The alternative hypothesis in the Hausman test however
is very general and merely indicates that there is a problem with the
speciﬁcation of the model. An issue with measurement errors, for ex-
ample because self-assessed health does not correctly represent true
health, can also cause the signiﬁcance of this parameter test.8
Another approach is to include all the objective health measures
in the participation equation along with the self-assessed health. In
the third column of table 5 we see that both the self-assessed health
and several of the objective measures are signiﬁcant.9 The implica-
tion is that the subjective and objective measures do not provide the
same information but instead complement each other. If they would
be substitutes, either one would be signiﬁcant but not both. The
ﬁnding that the eﬀect of subjective health remains signiﬁcantly pos-
itive when objective measures are included is an indication that the
self-assessed health captures variations that are not picked up by the
objective measures, showing the incompleteness of the set of objec-
tive characteristics. However this is equally true for the subjective
self-assessed health: it does not capture all health aspects that are
relevant in the participation decision.
Important to note is that the impact of other characteristics,
and in particular of the ﬁnancial variables, is rather insensitive to
the methods used to include health status. The main diﬀerences are
that the eﬀects of education and type of occupation become slightly
stronger after instrumentation.
8 The same test but using the health measures that did not qualify as in-
struments (see note 6) as additional potential endogenous variables, and thus
also adding the diﬀerence between their true and predicted values as additional
variables to equation (1), shows that in that case the set of prediction errors is
not jointly signiﬁcant. This suggests that incomplete measurement causes the
misspeciﬁcation.
9 The ﬁrst-stage regressions already suggested that this could be the case (see
note 6). Similar ﬁndings are reported by Kalwij and Vermeulen (2007) for several
European countries and Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) for the US.Table 4
Second-stage structural-form regression
labor force participation self-assessed health
(probit, eq. 3) (ordered probit, eq. 4)
health (lin.pred.) 0.310*** (0.021)
labor force part. (lin.pred.) -0.011 (0.033)
age -0.046** (0.021) -0.047*** (0.015)
age squared (*100) -0.001 (0.016) 0.034*** (0.012)
gender: female -1.046*** (0.038) -0.005 (0.045)
# children (live births) -0.002 (0.004) -0.007 ** (0.004)
married/living together 2001 -0.227 *** (0.034) -0.102 *** (0.029)
educ.: primary -0.138*** (0.047) 0.067* (0.038)
educ.: secondary -0.126* (0.075) 0.250 *** (0.059)
educ.: technical/commercial -0.199 ** (0.081) 0.313 *** (0.059)
educ.: preparatory or higher -0.051 (0.082) 0.437 *** (0.052)
able to read and write 0.051 (0.056) -0.018 (0.044)
able to count from 1 to 10 0.149 ** (0.068) -0.027 (0.054)
able to speak English -0.115** (0.054) 0.188 *** (0.041)
able to speak indigenous language 0.013 (0.057) 0.113 *** (0.041)
locality size: 15000-100000 0.080 * (0.041) -0.164 *** (0.033)
locality size: 2500-15000 0.185 *** (0.055) -0.202 *** (0.045)
locality size: <2500 0.224 *** (0.048) -0.253 *** (0.034)Table 4
(continued)
labor force participation self-assessed health
(probit, eq. 3) (ordered probit, eq. 4)
non-business assets (*$1mln) -0.079 *** (0.024) 0.102 *** (0.019)
hypertension/high blood pressure -0.222 *** (0.025)
diabetes/high blood sugar level -0.508 *** (0.034)
cancer/malignant tumor -0.199 * (0.102)
respiratory disease (e.g. asthma) -0.395 *** (0.050)
heart attack -0.323 *** (0.071)
stroke -0.193 ** (0.088)
arthritis/rheumatism -0.225 *** (0.030)
liver/kidney infection (in last 2 yrs) -0.211 *** (0.040)
tuberculosis (in last 2 yrs) -0.045 (0.186)
pneumonia (in last 2 yrs) -0.178 * (0.107)
fallen down (in last 2 yrs) -0.071 *** (0.026)
# mental health problems (max.9) -0.128 *** (0.005)
# problems with (i)adl (max.22) -0.077 *** (0.004)
< 65; ever deposited in pension fund 0.332 *** (0.057)
≤ 65; ever deposited in pension fund -0.112 * (0.067)
# years with pension fund deposits -0.006 *** (0.002)
occ.: agriculture 0.025 (0.050)Table 4
(continued)
labor force participation self-assessed health
(probit, eq. 3) (ordered probit, eq. 4)
occ.: proﬀ., technic., educat. -0.051 (0.069)
occ.: management position 0.148 (0.120)
occ.: administrative activ. -0.185 *** (0.064)
occ.: merchants, sales repr. 0.352 *** (0.051)
occ.: service ind., domest. w. -0.057 (0.044)
occ.: other -0.405 * (0.209)
contr.: boss 0.590 *** (0.091)
contr.: self-employed 0.533 *** (0.038)
contr.: commission, other paym 0.169 *** (0.058)
contr.: without payment -0.038 (0.086)
contr.: other/unknown 0.041 (0.173)
constant 4.146 *** (0.683)
cut-oﬀ point 1 (m1) -3.935 *** (0.513)
cut-oﬀ point 2 (m2) -2.227 *** (0.514)
cut-oﬀ point 3 (m3) -0.735 (0.514)
cut-oﬀ point 4 (m4) -0.093 (0.514)
number of obs. 10183 10183
log likelihood -5299.2 -10427.4Table 4
(continued)
labor force participation self-assessed health
(probit, eq. 3) (ordered probit, eq. 4)
Wald χ2 (33) vs. constant-only 2725.0 *** p = 0.000
Wald χ2 (31) vs. constant-only 3518.0 *** p = 0.000
McFadden R2 0.245 0.172
Note: Estimated coeﬃcients, standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, *: signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Standard errors are bootstrapped (1000 replications, resampling with replacement, conﬁdence intervals
based on normal approximation).Table 5
Alternative tests of endogeneity and misspeciﬁcation of health
[1] [2] [3]
Subjective Hausman-test Subj. &
information obj. information
self-assessed health (0-4) .214 *** (.018) .358 *** (.023) .118 *** (.020)
age -.054 *** (.020) -.046 ** (.021) -.063 *** (.020)
age squared (*100) .003 (.015) -.001 (.016) .013 (.016)
gender: female -1.104 *** (.037) -1.048 *** (.038) -1.080 *** (.039)
# children (live births) -.005 (.004) -.002 (.004) -.003 (.004)
married/living together 2001 -.236 *** (.034) -.228 *** (.034) -.232*** (.034)
educ.: primary -.110 ** (.047) -.135 *** (.047) -.121 ** (.047)
educ.: secondary -.056 (.073) -.126 * (.075) -.084 (.073)
educ.: technical/commercial -.103 (.080) -.198 ** (.082) -.133 * (.080)
educ.: preparatory or higher .072 (.081) -.048 (.082) .044 (.082)
able to read and write .044 (.055) .049 (.056) .041 (.056)
able to count from 1 to 10 .137 ** (.066) .151 ** (.068) .137 ** (.067)
able to speak English -.082 (.052) -.119 ** (.054) -.078 (.052)
able to speak indigenous language .046 (.056) .011 (.057) .033 (.056)
locality size: 15000-100000 .057 (.041) .082 ** (.042) .026 (.042)
locality size: 2500-15000 .166 *** (.054) .186 *** (.054) .142 *** (.055)
locality size: < 2500 .189 *** (.048) .225 *** (.048) .164 *** (.049)
non-business assets (*$1mln) -.060** (.023) -.081*** (.024) -.056** (.024)Table 5
(continued)
[1] [2] [3]
Subjective Hausman-test Subj. &
information obj. information
< 65; ever deposited in pension fund .336 *** (.057) .331 *** (.057) .345 *** (.057)
≥ 65; ever deposited in pension fund -.102 (.069) -.114 * (.067) -.106 (.069)
# years with pension fund deposits -.006*** (.002) -.006*** (.002) -.006*** (.002)
occ.: agriculture .017 (.049) .025 (.050) .013 (.050)
occ.: proﬀ., technic., educat. -.031 (.068) -.054 (.069) -.026 (.069)
occ.: management position .179 (.118) .148 (.120) .185 (.118)
occ.: administrative activ. -.155 ** (.066) -.187 *** (.064) -.161 ** (.066)
occ.: merchants, sales repr. .361 *** (.051) .351 *** (.051) .351 *** (.052)
occ.: service ind.,domest.w. -.053 (.044) -.057 (.044) -.062 (.044)
occ.: other -.376 * (.203) -.404* (.210) -.414** (.205)
contr.: boss .606 *** (.086) .594 *** (.092) .630 *** (.088)
contr.: self-employed .533 *** (.038) .534 *** (.038) .524 *** (.038)
contr.: commission, other paym .163 *** (.056) .168 *** (.057) .160 *** (.057)
contr.: without payment -.000 (.083) -.037 (.086) -.005 (.084)
contr.: other/unknown .065 (.171) .043 (.173) .065 (.173)
health prediction error -.243 *** (.024)
hypertension/high blood pressure -.063 ** (.031)
diabetes/high blood sugar level -.148 *** (.040)Table 5
(continued)
[1] [2] [3]
Subjective Hausman-test Subj. &
information obj. information
cancer/malignant tumor .020 (.105)
respiratory disease (e.g. asthma) .066 (.061)
heart attack -.075 (.082)
stroke -.296*** (.098)
arthritis/rheumatism .059 (.037)
liver/kidney infection (in last 2 yrs) .041 (.048)
tuberculosis (in last 2 yrs) -.181 (.300)
pneumonia (in last 2 yrs) .099 (.128)
fallen down (in last 2 yrs) .078 ** (.031)
# mental health problems (max. 9) .001 (.006)
# problems with (i)adl (max. 22) -.052*** (.004)
constant 3.425 *** (.641) 3.823 *** (.687) 3.895 *** (.664)
number of obs. 10183 10183 10183
log likelihood -5334.9 -5282.5 -5226.9
Wald χ2 (33) vs. constant-only 2433.0*** p = .000
Wald χ2 (34) vs. constant-only 2708.8*** p = .000Table 5
(continued)
[1] [2] [3]
Subjective Hausman-test Subj. &
information obj. information
Wald χ2 (46) vs. constant-only 2489.4*** p = .000
Wald χ2 (13) of obj. health char. 206.5*** p = .000
McFadden R2 .240 .247 .255
Estimated coeﬃcients, standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, *: signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Dependent
variable in each column is labor force participation. Columns 1 and 3 contain heteroskedasticity-corrected stan-
dard errors, while standard errors for column 2 are bootstrapped (1000 replications, resampling with replacement,
conﬁdence intervals based on normal approximation).120 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
6. Conclusions
We investigated the labor participation decision for elderly in Mexico,
and in particular we studied the role of health in this decision. A
relevant consideration in this type of analysis is the measurement of
health and its potential endogeneity. Self-assessed health is suspected
to depend on the actual labor force decision that is observed; people
may justify inactivity by exaggerating their health problems. Health
can also directly depend on participation, for example due to bad
labor conditions. The data used in this paper, drawn from the 2001-
wave of the Mexican Health and Aging Survey, include self-assessed
health status and also contain detailed information on the prevalence
of various diseases and symptoms. This allows us to test the validity
of the use of self-assessed health in models explaining the labor force
participation decision.
The various estimations do not indicate that the self-assessed
health status is an endogenous variable when explaining the labor
force participation of elderly workers. We ﬁnd a strong eﬀect running
from health to participation, where better health increases the prob-
ability of participation in the labor market, while we ﬁnd no clear
evidence of a causation running in the other direction. However it
remains possible that a negative direct eﬀect of work on health ex-
ists but is oﬀset by the (opposing) justiﬁcation eﬀect. Our ﬁndings
are not uncommon in the literature: evidence of causation from par-
ticipation to health is generally weak while the eﬀect of health on
the participation decision is often found to be strong. However a di-
rect comparison of the strength of the relations with the literature is
complicated because of the wide variety of methods used to measure
health.
We ﬁnd indications that there is a measurement issue. The re-
sults suggest that the self-assessed health does not capture all relevant
health aspects, but that some diseases and symptoms have indepen-
dent eﬀects on labor force participation. Despite their eﬀects on the
self-assessed health, the impact on labor force participation is not suf-
ﬁciently captured in the self-assessed health: productive capacity is
reduced more. Simply replacing self-assessed health by the objective
health characteristics, or a construct thereof, appears too rough to
catch the eﬀect of health. However, the other variables explaining
the participation decision are rather insensitive to the inclusion of
self-assessed health, health stock, or a set of objective characteristics.
This suggests that as long as the interest of the researcher is not the
health per se, self-assessed health can be used in the analysis.THE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH 121
An important result is that the role of ﬁnancial considerations in
Mexico is not diﬀerent from other countries: those who contributed to
a retirement fund are more likely to withdraw from the labor market
when they satisfy the requirements to receive a pension. However the
number of employees who made such contributions is much lower than
in other countries, which explains why more elderly remain active in
the labor market. Although it is a bit premature to draw far-reaching
conclusions, it seems clear that general improvements in opportuni-
ties for ﬁnancial support after retirement will increase the number of
non-working elderly. Together with an aging population that would
imply that a relatively decreasing number of young employees will
have to pay the beneﬁts for an increasing number of retirees. The
ﬁnding that health is a relevant determinant in labor decisions im-
plies that policies aimed at improving the general health situation are
likely to contribute to the future labor force participation. However,
general improvement of health is by deﬁnition a slow process that
can therefore only partially compensate the pressure on the pension
system that will be created if more elderly enjoy retirement beneﬁts.
Future research should exploit the panel structure of the data to
analyze the relation between changes in health and changes in labor
market status. In general, more detailed analysis of the health gra-
dient seems important, as we ﬁnd that the constructs used in this
paper do not unequivocally capture all relevant aspects. Another po-
tential improvement is to distinguish subgroups and allow diﬀerent
eﬀects for men and women, and for diﬀerent age groups. In this pa-
per all persons aged over 50 are included in one analysis. We ﬁnd
strong indications that labor force participation is much more likely
for men than for women, and the (implicit) assumption that the ef-
fects of other explanatory variables are equal for men and women may
be too strong. The same may hold for diﬀerent age groups. Future
analysis should study the diﬀerence between retirement as deﬁned in
this paper (not active in the labor market) and the actual receipt
of retirement beneﬁts, in combination with the fact that the latter
does not imply that the recipient is not working in another (formal
or informal) job. A related aspect that deserves attention is the po-
tential impact of access to medical services, which generally is linked
to formal employment.122 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
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F irst-stage reduced-form estim ations
labor force participation self-assessed health
(probit) (ordered probit)
age -0.066 *** (0.020) -0.047 *** (0.015)
age squared (*100) 0.016 (0.016) 0.034 *** (0.011)
gender: female -1.077 *** (0.039) -0.001 (0.029)
# children (live births) -0.004 (0.004) -0.007* (0.004)
married/living together 2001 -0.238 *** (0.034) -0.100*** (0.027)
educ.: primary -0.119 ** (0.047) 0.059 (0.038)
educ.: secondary -0.070 (0.073) 0.206 *** (0.058)
educ.: technical/commercial -0.118 (0.080) 0.243 *** (0.064)
educ.: preparatory or higher 0.064 (0.081) 0.342 *** (0.063)
able to read and write 0.043 (0.055) -0.025 (0.045)
able to count from 1 to 10 0.132 ** (0.067) -0.027 (0.054)
able to speak English -0.061 (0.052) 0.182 *** (0.041)
able to speak indigenous language 0.044 (0.056) 0.122 *** (0.042)
locality size: 15000-100000 0.014 (0.042) -0.154 *** (0.034)
locality size: 2500-15000 0.127 ** (0.055) -0.177 *** (0.044)
locality size: < 2500 0.148 *** (0.049) -0.214 *** (0.038)A ppendi x
(continued)
labor force participation self-assessed health
(probit) (ordered probit)
non-business assets (*$1mln) -0.046* (0.024) 0.093 *** (0.018)
hypertension/high blood pressure -0.079** (0.031) -0.223 *** (0.025)
diabetes/high blood sugar level -0.184*** (0.040) -0.511 *** (0.034)
cancer/malignant tumor 0.008 (0.105) -0.198 * (0.103)
respiratory disease (e.g. asthma) 0.040 (0.061) -0.398 *** (0.051)
heart attack -0.097 (0.082) -0.337 *** (0.070)
stroke -0.307 *** (0.098) -0.188 ** (0.084)
arthritis/rheumatism 0.043 (0.037) -0.223 *** (0.030)
liver/kidney infection (in last 2 yrs) 0.025 (0.048) -0.213 *** (0.040)
tuberculosis (in last 2 yrs) -0.172 (0.298) -0.036 (0.178)
pneumonia (in last 2 yrs) 0.086 (0.127) -0.170 (0.100)
fallen down (in last 2 yrs) 0.073 ** (0.031) -0.071 *** (0.025)
# mental health problems (max. 9) -0.008 (0.006) -0.128 *** (0.005)
# problems with (i)adl (max. 22) -0.057 *** (0.004) -0.077 *** (0.004)
< 65; ever deposited in pension fund 0.350 *** (0.057) 0.051 (0.043)
¸ 65; ever deposited in pension fund -0.098 (0.069) 0.061 (0.056)
# years with pension fund deposits -0.006 *** (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
occ.: agriculture 0.010 (0.050) -0.058 (0.040)A ppendi x
(continued)
labor force participation self-assessed health
(probit) (ordered probit)
occ.: pro®., technic., educat. -0.017 (0.068) 0.102 * (0.053)
occ.: management position 0.196 * (0.118) 0.148 * (0.087)
occ.: administrative activ. -0.152 ** (0.066) 0.098 * (0.050)
occ.: merchants, sales repr. 0.354 *** (0.051) 0.022 (0.040)
occ.: service ind., domest. w. -0.060 (0.044) 0.014 (0.036)
occ.: other -0.415 ** (0.204) -0.006 (0.152)
contr.: boss 0.636 *** (0.087) 0.148 ** (0.063)
contr.: self-employed 0.523 *** (0.038) -0.008 (0.030)
contr.: commission, other paym 0.163 *** (0.057) 0.015 (0.046)
contr.: without payment 0.002 (0.084) 0.109 * (0.066)
contr.: other/unknown 0.070 (0.173) 0.101 (0.138)
constant 4.218 *** (0.661)
cut-o® point 1 (m ) -3.895 *** (0.481) 1
cut-o® point 2 (m ) -2.185 *** (0.480) 2
cut-o® point 3 (m ) -0.691 (0.480) 3
cut-o® point 4 (m ) -0.048 (0.480) 4
number of obs. 10183 10183
log likelihood -5244.2 -10415.7A ppendi x
(continued)
labor force participation self-assessed health
(probit) (ordered probit)
2 Wald Â (45) vs. constant-only 2481.6 *** p =0 :000 3398.3 *** p =0 :000
2 Wald Â (13) of obj. health char. 2345.0 *** p =0 :000
2 Wald Â (15) of labor history 496.4 *** p =0 :000
2 McFadden R 0.252 0.173
N ote: E stim ated coe± cients,heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses. ***,**, *:
si gni ¯cant at 1% ,5% ,10% .